Bob jones university policy against interracial dating
Ellis for the Center for Law and Religious Freedom of the Christian Legal Society; by Forest D. Raim for the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith; by John H. Lake, and Adam Yarmolinsky for Independent Sector; by Amy Young-Anawaty, David Carliner, Burt Neuborne, and Harry A. Accordingly, the court entered summary judgment for the IRS on its counterclaim. or educational purposes" are entitled to tax exemption. Such an examination reveals unmistakable evidence that, underlying all relevant parts of the Code, is the intent that entitlement to tax exemption depends on meeting certain common-law standards of charity - namely, that an institution seeking tax-exempt status must serve a public purpose and not be contrary to established public policy. "A charitable use, where neither law nor public policy forbids, may be applied to almost any thing that tends to promote the well-doing and well-being of social man." Ould v.
Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (IRC) provides that "[c]orporations . But in 1970, the IRS concluded that it could no longer justify allowing tax-exempt status under 501(c)(3) to private schools that practiced racial discrimination, and in 1971 issued Revenue Ruling 71-447 providing that a private school not having a racially nondiscriminatory policy as to students is not "charitable" within the common-law concepts reflected in 170 and 501(c)(3). 81-3, petitioner Bob Jones University, while permitting unmarried Negroes to enroll as students, denies admission to applicants engaged in an interracial marriage or known to advocate interracial marriage or dating. William Bentley Ball argued the cause for petitioner in No.
United States, also on certiorari to the same court. organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable . Until 1970, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) granted tax-exempt status under 501(c)(3) to private schools, independent of racial admissions policies, and granted charitable deductions for contributions to such schools under 170 of the IRC.
And it is well settled that, in interpreting a statute, the court will not look merely to a particular clause in which general words may be used, but will take in connection with it the whole statute . Tax exemptions for certain institutions thought beneficial to the social order of the country as a whole, or to a particular community, are deeply rooted in our history, as in that of England.
Fn Fn Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal in No. But this mode of expounding a statute has never been adopted by any enlightened tribunal - because it is evident that in many cases it would defeat the object which the Legislature intended to accomplish. 11 The form of 170 simply makes plain what common sense and history tell us: in enacting both 170 and 501(c)(3), Congress sought to provide tax benefits to charitable organizations, to encourage the development of private institutions that serve a useful public purpose or supplement or take the place of public institutions of the same kind.
But then he remembers that in 2013, it’s no longer acceptable to rail against the Bob Jones decision as an example of the persecution of Christians the way that Liberty’s founder, Jerry Falwell, did back when he was founding the Moral Majority.
So Barber quickly corrects himself to say it was “ultimately a good decision” — thereby ruining his own analogy.
Now, as then, the word “Christianity” is being used as a synonym for unvarnished bigotry.
That is what Liberty Counsel means when it says it is a “Christian” organization.
We granted certiorari to decide whether petitioners, nonprofit private schools that prescribe and enforce racially discriminatory admissions standards on the basis of religious doctrine, qualify as tax-exempt organizations under 501(c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. 501(c)(3), 1 and granted charitable deductions for contributions to such schools under 170 of the Code, 26 U. 7 The IRS counterclaimed for 0,073.96 in unpaid social security and unemployment taxes for the years 1969 through 1972, including interest and penalties. The court nevertheless rejected Goldsboro's claim to tax-exempt status under 501(c) (3), finding that "private schools maintaining racially discriminatory admissions policies violate clearly declared federal policy and, therefore, must be denied the federal tax benefits flowing from qualification under Section 501(c)(3)." Id., at 1318.